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A monopolist sells a single product to a population of consumers. The cost per
unit of supplying this product is constant and equal to c. Consumers have utility
functions of the form u(q;￿)￿T, where q is the quantity consumed, ￿ is a parameter
a⁄ecting demand, and T is the payment for consumption. The function u satis￿es
u(0;￿) ￿ 0;u￿ ￿ 0 and uq￿ ￿ 0. Consumers gain information about their preferences
in two stages: ￿rst they learn a parameter ￿, which does not enter directly into their
utility function, then they learn ￿. The distribution of ￿ depends on ￿, and write
the distribution function for ￿ given ￿ as F(￿;￿). We assume that higher values of
￿ make higher values of ￿ more likely, i.e. that F￿(￿;￿) ￿ 0. Crucially, we make
the assumption that the support of ￿ does not depend on ￿, and say this support is
[￿L;￿H]. The distribution function for ￿ is G(￿) with support [￿L;￿H].
The ￿rm o⁄ers a family of tari⁄s from which a consumer must choose after ￿ is
known but before ￿ is known. Let the family of tari⁄s be indexed by ￿, and so a
consumer is free to choose to buy from any tari⁄ T(q;￿). Given a particular family
of tari⁄s T(q;￿), de￿ne
s(￿;￿) ￿ max
q ￿ 0
: u(q;￿) ￿ T(q;￿)
and write q(￿;￿) to be the quantity that solves the above problem. Then, in the usual
way, if the type ￿ consumer chooses the tari⁄ T(￿; ^ ￿) she obtains expected surplus
v(￿; ^ ￿) ￿
Z ￿H
￿L
u￿(q(￿; ^ ￿);￿)(1 ￿ F(￿;￿)) d￿ + s(￿L; ^ ￿) (1)
and the ￿rm obtains expected pro￿t of
Z ￿H
￿L
f[u(q(￿; ^ ￿);￿) ￿ cq(￿; ^ ￿)]f(￿;￿) ￿ u￿(q(￿; ^ ￿);￿)(1 ￿ F(￿;￿))g d￿
￿s(￿L; ^ ￿) : (2)
(Here, f ￿ F￿.) Thus in doing this we have eliminated the underlying tari⁄ T(￿; ^ ￿)
and expressed consumer surplus and pro￿t given ￿ and ^ ￿ in terms of the demand
pro￿le q(￿; ^ ￿) and the minimal surplus term s(￿L; ^ ￿). Clearly, provided the function
q(￿; ^ ￿) is (weakly) increasing in ￿, a tari⁄ T(￿; ^ ￿) can be found that induces the
1demand pro￿le q(￿; ^ ￿). We can therefore think of the ￿rm as choosing q(￿; ^ ￿) and
s(￿L; ^ ￿) rather a family of tari⁄s T(￿;￿).
What remains to do is to ensure that the scheme is incentive compatible and that
the type ￿ consumer chooses ^ ￿ = ￿. Write
V (￿) = max
￿L￿^ ￿￿￿H
: v(￿; ^ ￿)





u￿(q(￿;￿);￿)F￿(￿;￿) d￿ ￿ 0 : (3)
In particular, V (￿) is increasing in ￿ and so if the participation constraint is satis￿ed
for the lowest type ￿ = ￿L it is satis￿ed for all types. Therefore, it must be optimal
from the ￿rm￿ s point of view to set V (￿L) = 0. We deduce from (3) that under any
incentive compatible scheme that satis￿es the participation constraints, the rent of
the type ￿ is given by





u￿(q(￿; ^ ￿);￿)F￿(￿; ^ ￿) d￿ d^ ￿ : (4)
From (1), the term s(￿L;￿) must then be given by
s(￿L;￿) = V (￿) ￿
Z ￿H
￿L
u￿(q(￿; ^ ￿);￿)(1 ￿ F(￿;￿)) d￿ (5)
where V (￿) is given by (4).
Lemma 1 If the function s(￿L;￿) in (1) is given by (5) above, then the type ￿
consumer will choose ^ ￿ = ￿ in (1) provided that q(￿;￿) is (weakly) increasing in ￿.
Proof. Substituting for s(￿L; ^ ￿) as de￿ned in (5) into (1) and di⁄erentiating with
respect to ^ ￿ yields
v^ ￿(￿; ^ ￿) =
Z ￿H
￿L
uq￿(q(￿; ^ ￿);￿)q￿(￿; ^ ￿)[F(￿; ^ ￿) ￿ F(￿;￿)] d￿ :
Therefore, since uq￿ is assumed to be non-negative and q￿ is assumed in the statement
of the lemma to be non-negative, the function v(￿; ^ ￿) is increasing in ^ ￿ for ^ ￿ ￿ ￿
and increasing in ^ ￿ for ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ and hence is maximized at ^ ￿ = ￿ as required. ￿
(Note that, although it is necessary for implementability that q be increasing in
￿, we do not claim that it is necessary, only su¢ cient, that q be increasing in ￿.)
2We can now write the ￿rm￿ s total pro￿t purely in terms of the demand pro￿le
q(￿;￿). From (2), the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t from the type ￿ consumer is
Z ￿H
￿L
u(q(￿;￿);￿)f(￿;￿) d￿ ￿ V (￿)






[u(q(￿;￿);￿) ￿ cq(￿;￿)]f(￿;￿) d￿ ￿ V (￿)
￿
dG(￿) :
But using integration by parts and the relationship (3) yields
Z ￿H
￿L





￿u￿(q(￿;￿);￿)F￿(￿;￿)(1 ￿ G(￿)) d￿d￿







+ u￿(q(￿;￿);￿)F￿(￿;￿)(1 ￿ G(￿))g d￿ d￿ : (6)
Therefore, the candidate for the pro￿t-maximizing quantity pro￿le is




Provided this function is weakly increasing in both ￿ and ￿, and this requires a
joint condition on the functional forms of u;F and G, then (7) certainly gives the
pro￿t-maximizing demand pro￿le.
EXAMPLE: Let u(q;￿) = ￿u(q) and F(￿;￿) = 1 ￿ e￿￿=￿.
In this case the utility function takes the multiplicative form often used in models
of nonlinear pricing, and the parameter ￿ is exponentially distributed with mean ￿.
From (7), the candidate demand pro￿le q(￿;￿) maximizes









￿u(q) ￿ cq :
This function is increasing in both ￿ and ￿ provided the standard hazard rate con-
dition that (1 ￿ G(￿))=(￿g(￿)) is decreasing holds. (Demand is zero when (1 ￿
G(￿))=(￿g(￿)) ￿ 1.) Notice that this example has the feature that each tari⁄T(q;￿)
is just a two-part tari⁄ with marginal price equal to
c
1 ￿ (1 ￿ G(￿))=(￿g(￿))
and so the pro￿t-maximizing strategy is to o⁄er consumers a menu of two-part tari⁄s.
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